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ABSTRACT 
This studyexamines the relationship between the internal corporate governance 
mechanisms related to the board of directors, the audit committee characteristics and the 
performance of listed companies on Saudi Stock Market (TADAWL) in 201 0, excluding 
financial companies.The theoretical foundation of this relationship was provided by the 
agency and institutional theory. The data on the relationship between the audit 
committee and internal audit function was collected through a mail questionnaire. Of the 
135 questionnaires distributed, 73 questionnaires, representing a response rate of 54.07 
percent, were returned of which 62 (45.93 percent) were usable responses. Other 
information on firm performance, board of directors and audit committees characteristics 
was obtained from the annual reports of the respective companies (year-ending 2010). 
By using the multiple regression analysis, the results show that the effect of internal 
corporate governance variables on return on assets and Tobin's Q was somewhat 
different. The results indicate that the proportion of non-executive directors was found to 
be positively significant to return on assets. However, the board size was found to be 
negatively significant to Tobin's Q. For audit committee characteristics, the extent of 
audit committee reviews of IA proposals variable was reported to be positively 
significant to both measures of firm performance (return on assets and Tobin's Q).In 
relation to the practical and theoretical contribution, this study provides theoretical 
validity by suggesting that institutional theory may be more appropriate than agency 
theory in describing the practices of corporate governance in developing countries such 
as Saudi Arabia. From a practical perspective, the findings of this study provide 
feedback to the regulators (e.g. Capital Market Authority) and the companies in Saudi 
Arabia in a number of ways. 
Keywords:corporate governance, firm performance, board of directors, audit 
committee, Saudi Arabia 
ABSTRAK 
Kajian ini mengkaji hubungan antara mekanisme tadbir urus dalaman korporat yang 
berkaitan dengan lembaga pengarah, ciri-ciri jawatankuasa audit dan prestasi syarikat 
yang disenaraikan di Pasaran Saham Saudi (TADAWL) pada tahun 2010, tidak 
termasuk syarikat-syarikat kewangan. Asas teori hubungan ini telah disediakan oleh 
agensi dan teori institusi. Data mengenai hubungan antara jawatankuasa audit dan fungsi 
audit dalaman telah dikumpulkan melalui soal selidik mel. Daripada 135 soal selidik 
yang diedarkan, 73 soal selidik, mewakili kadar tindak balas 54,07 peratus, telah 
dikembalikan di mana 62 (45,93 peratus) adalah jawapan yang boleh digunakan. 
Maklumat lain mengenai firma papan prestasi, pengarah dan jawatankuasa audit ciri-ciri 
yang diperolehi daripada laporan tahunan syarikat masing-masing (tahun berakhir 2010). 
Dengan menggunakan analisis regresi berganda, keputusan menunjukkan bahawa kesan 
pembolehubah tadbir urus dalaman korporat pada return on assets dan Tobin's Q adalah 
agak berbeza. Keputusan menunjukkan bahawa perkadaran pengarah bukan eksekutif 
telah didapati signifikan secara positif kepada return on assets . Walau bagaimanapun, 
saiz papan didapati negatif yang ketara kepada Tobin's Q. Bagi ciri-ciri jawatankuasa 
audit, takat ulasan jawatankuasa audit cadangan pembolehubah IA telah dilaporkan 
signifikan secara positif kepada kedua-dua langkah prestasi firma (return on assetsdan 
Tobin's Q). Dalam hubungan sumbangan praktikal dan teori, kajian ini menyediakan 
kesahihan teori dengan mencadangkan bahawa teori institusi mungkin lebih sesuai 
daripada teori agensi untuk menerangkan amalan tadbir urus korporat di negara-negara 
membangun seperti Arab Saudi. Dari perspektif praktikal, dapatan kajian ini memberi 
maklum balas kepada pengawal selia (contohnya Pihak Berkuasa Pasaran Modal) dan 
syarikat-syarikat di Arab Saudi dalam beberapa cara. 
Kata kunci:tadbir urus korporat, prestasi firma, lembaga pengarah, jawatankuasa audit, 
Saudi Arabia 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Background of the Study 
Corporate scandals, such as Enron (2001), Global Crossing (2002), Tyco (2002), and 
Worldcom (2002), have shaken investor confidence and made it difficult for companies to 
raise equity from the stock market (Agrawal, 2005). Zubaidah, Nurmala, & 
Kamaruzaman (2009) believed that the board of directors and its committees do not have 
good supervision of the management. For example, Enron manipulated its financial 
statements through off-balance sheet financing. The board was unable to disclose the 
distorted statements because of the lackofboard independence from senior executives 
(Deakin & Konzelman, 2004). Moreover, WorldCom materially overstated its earnings 
and finally filed for bankruptcy. The investigation showed that the audit committee failed 
to effectively oversee the managers'duties (Weiss, 2005).Consequently, these well- 
publicized corporate scandals,together with the Asian financial crisis in 1997, 
havehighlighted the importance of good corporate governance practices for the long-term 
survival of companies (Mokhtar et al., 2009). 
Regulators around the world are increasingly looking to set standards or codes of best 
practice for corporate governance to attract more capital or foreign investment to the 
country (Agrawal, 2005). For example, following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, 2002), 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and National Association of Corporate Directors 
(NASD) proposed a new corporate governance listing-standard,which was approved by 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
~nternal user 
only 
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